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Abstract
The baseline version of the new Keynesian (NK) model has important empirical limita-
tions, in particular with regard to inflation, output and interest rate dynamics. Some of its
recent extensions fare better empirically but only by relying on implausible pricing schemes.
We offer an alternative approach that emphasizes informational imperfections regarding mon-
etary aggregates. Monetary misperceptions give rise to a standard signal extraction problem
that enables the NK model to exhibit inflation inertia, realistic inflation and output dynamics
and a liquidity effect. Unlike previous work, we establish that misperceived money growth
is quantitatively important and also matters significantly for economic activity.
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Introduction
The New Keynesian model has gained wide acceptance. Nevertheless, the original version of
the model has a number of important implications that seem to be at variance with the empir-
ical evidence. Most prominent among them are the predicted monotone dynamics of inflation,
output and nominal interest rates in response to a monetary shock. This is inconsistent with
evidence presented by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (henceforth, CEE), 2005 suggesting
that following a monetary shock, there is a delayed, hump shaped response of inflation, a hump
shaped response of output and a liquidity effect.
A considerable amount of work has been devoted to addressing these difficulties. Broadly speak-
ing, two distinct approaches have been pursued. The first, advocated by Mankiw and Reis, 2002,
assumes information rather than price stickiness. While this seems attractive and is reminiscent
of Lucas’ imperfect information model, it does not provide a solution to the problem. As shown
by Collard and Dellas, 2004, and Dupor and Tsuruga, 2005, the sticky information version re-
quires an implausibly large amount of informational stickiness in order to generate satisfactory
macro–dynamics.
The second approach involves the introduction of backward looking agents. For instance, Gali
and Gertler, 1999 assume the existence of myopic agents who set prices in a mechanical fashion.
In a similar vein, CEE, 2005, assume that a fraction of the agents index their prices to past
inflation.1 With the inclusion also of several real rigidities, the modified version of the NK model
has proved very successful in generating inertial movements in inflation, output and the nominal
interest rate (CEE, 2005). Nonetheless, a key problem with this approach is that it seems to be
at variance with observed pricing patterns, as documented for instance in a recent ECB report
(Dhyne et al. 2005). Consequently, a specification that relies on backward price indexation in
order to generate realistic inflation dynamics may be problematic.
In this paper we propose an alternative approach which matches the performance of models
with backward indexation regarding but uses a more defensible pricing scheme. The approach
embeds Lucas’ story of mis–perceptions about monetary aggregates and signal extraction in a
model with sticky prices of the NK variety. Hence both unperceived and unanticipated money
matter.2 Clearly, one cannot claim that information on nominal aggregate variables is only
available with substantial time lags, as it was implied by the early vintage of the flexible price,
rational expectations models. But while information on monetary aggregates is readily available,
1Minford and Peel, 2004, argue that allowing such agents to adjust prices based on expected rather than on
past inflation eliminates the new Phillips curve.
2Woodford, 2002, examines the effects of nominal shocks in a model with signal extraction but with flexible
prices and wages. Such a model does not perform as well as its staggered prices counterpart.
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observations of the current or recent monetary data (the preliminary figures) are ridden with
measurement error, which is only gradually corrected through subsequent data revisions. In
order to establish that such “noise” in preliminary data plays an important role in the monetary
transmission mechanism (as suggested by King, 1981) we establish two things. First, that the
measurement error –the difference between preliminary and revised data– in money growth is
quantitatively significant. And second, that this error (which represent unperceived money)
matters for economic activity.
We show that a specification with a very small amount of measurement error in nominal aggre-
gates works quite well. Not only is it superior to the standard, full information version but it also
performs as well as the most successful empirically NK version (the one with backward agents)
regarding macroeconomic dynamics and unconditional properties. Signal extraction allows the
model to produce a weak instantaneous response to current shocks; a delayed, hump shaped
response of inflation and output following a monetary shock; and a liquidity effect.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2
discusses the calibration. Section 3 presents the main results. The last section offers some
concluding remarks.
1 The model
We first describe the behavior of the firms and the households in the case without a signal
extraction problem. The basic set up is the new Keynesian model with price rigidities, aug-
mented to include various real rigidities. The production side of the economy consists of two
sectors: one producing intermediate goods and the other a final good. The intermediate good is
produced with capital and labor and the final good with intermediate goods. The final good is
homogeneous and can be used for consumption (private and public) and investment purposes.
1.1 Final sector
The final good, y, is produced by combining intermediate goods, yi, by perfectly competitive
firms. The production function is given by
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yθitdi
) 1
θ
(1)
where θ ∈ (−∞, 1).
The final good may be used for consumption — private or public — and investment purposes.
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1.2 Intermediate goods producers
Each firm i, i ∈ (0, 1), produces an intermediate good by means of capital and labor according to
a constant returns–to–scale technology, represented by the Cobb–Douglas production function
yit = at(uitkit)αn1−αit with α ∈ (0, 1) (2)
where kit and nit are physical capital and labor used by firm i. at is an exogenous, stationary,
stochastic, technology shock. uit is the rate of capital utilization.
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive, and therefore set prices for the
good they produce. Following Calvo, we assume that in each and every period, a firm either
gets the chance to adjust its price (with probability γ) or it does not. If it does not get the
chance, then it sets its price according to
Pit = ξtPit−1 (3)
We still have to place assumption on the behavior of ξt. We consider two scenarios. In the
first one, which will be used in the version of the model with the signal extraction formulation,
the price is assumed to remain fixed until the firm gets a call that allows it to reset its price
optimally. In this case, we have ξt = 1. In our view, this is the more realistic scenario as the
evidence on price setting suggests that firms set their prices infrequently and discretely. The
second scenario is the one suggested by CEE, and has these firms index their prices to the lagged,
economy wide rate of inflation. This case amounts to assume that ξt = pit−1. This scheme is
quite popular in the literature in spite of the fact that it is not rational3, and it also introduces
a completely free parameter.
For a firm i that sets its price optimally in period t, its price, P ?t , is given by
P ?t =
1
θ
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(1− γ)τΦt+τP
2−θ
1−θ
t+τ Ξ
1
θ−1
t,τ ψt+τyt+τ
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(1− γ)τΦt+τΞ
θ
θ−1
t,τ P
1
θ−1
t+τ yt+τ
(4)
where ψ is real marginal cost, P is the aggregate price index, Φt+τ is an appropriate discount
factor derived from the household’s optimality conditions and
Ξt+τ =

τ−1∏
`=0
ξt+` for τ > 1
1 τ = 0
Since the price setting scheme is independent of any firm specific characteristic, all firms that
reset their prices will choose the same price.
3The firms could easily index their price to the expected aggregate rate of inflation instead. Such information
is as readily available as that on lagged inflation from surveys, central bank forecasts or targets and so on.
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1.3 The Household
The preferences of the representative household are given by
Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[
log(ct+τ − ϑct+τ−1) + ν
m
1− σm
(
Mt+τ
Pt+τ
)1−σm
− ν
h
1 + σh
h1+σht+τ
]
(5)
where 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor, ct denotes consumption in period t, Mt/Pt is
real balances and ht is the quantity of labor she supplies. Preferences are characterized by habit
persistence governed by the parameter ϑ.
In each period, the representative household faces the budget constraint
EtQtBt +Mt + Pt(ct + it + a(ut)kt) = Bt−1 +Mt−1 + Ptztutkt + Ptwtht +Ωt +Πt (6)
where Bt is state contingent deliveries of the final good and Qt is the corresponding price of the
asset that delivers these goods. Mt is end of period t money holdings. Pt, the nominal price
of goods. ct and it are consumption and investment expenditure respectively; kt is the amount
of physical capital owned by the household and leased to the firms at the real rental rate zt.
Only a fraction ut of the capital stock is utilized in any period, which involves an increasing and
convex cost a(ut). wt is the real wage. Ωt is a nominal lump-sum transfer received from the
monetary authority and Πt denotes the profits distributed to the household by the firms.
Capital accumulates according to the law of motion
kt+1 = Φ(it, it−1, kt) + (1− δ)kt (7)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the rate of depreciation. Φ(·) is a general specification that allows the
modeling of either capital or investment adjustment costs (its properties will be discussed later).
1.4 The monetary authorities
We assume that monetary policy involves an exogenous money supply rule, with money evolving
according to
Mt = exp(µt)Mt−1 (8)
The gross growth rate of the money supply, µt, is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic
process. We have also repeated the analysis under a standard interest rate policy rule without
any change in the results (see discussion in the results section).
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1.5 The government
The government finances government expenditure on the domestic final good using lump sum
taxes. The stationary component of government expenditures is assumed to follow an exogenous
stochastic process, whose properties will be defined later.
2 Parametrization
For comparison purposes, the parametrization of the model relies heavily on CEE, 2005. The
model is parameterized on US quarterly data for the post WWII period. When necessary, the
data are taken from the Federal Reserve Database.4 The parameters are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration: Benchmark case
Discount factor β 0.988
Habit persistence ϑ 0.650
Inverse labor supply elasticity σh 1.000
Money demand elasticity σm 10.500
Capital elasticity of intermediate output α 0.281
Parameter of markup θ 0.850
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Adjustment costs parameter ϕ 0.330
Probability of price resetting γ 0.250
Steady state money supply growth (gross) µ 1.000
Share of government spending g/y 0.200
The capital accumulation function Φ(it, it−1, kt) is assumed to take the following form
Φ(it, it−1, kt) =
(
1− ωS
(
it
it−1
)
− (1− ω)ϕ
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2 kt
it
)
it
The function S(·) satisfies S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) = ϕ > 0. Φ(it, it−1, kt) nests two
investment adjustment costs (ω = 1) and capital adjustment costs (ω = 0). We mainly focus
on the investment adjustment costs case and therefore set ω = 1. The investment adjustment
cost parameter ϕ is then chosen so that the model can match the first order autocorrelation of
output (0.84). This implies ϕ = 0.33. Note, however, that the same results obtain when we
borrow the value of ϕ used in CEE (ϕ = 2.5), instead of calibrating it. The capital utilization
function a(ut) satisfies a(1) = 0, a′′(1)/a′(1) = 1/σa. We set σa = 100.
4URL:http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/
5
The three shocks, the technology shock, at = log(At/A), the fiscal shock, gt, and the money
supply shock are assumed to follow independent, AR(1) processes with persistence parameters
ρa, ρg, ρµ respectively and standard deviation of innovations σa, σg, σµ respectively. These values
are given in table 2. The process for government expenditures was estimated on historical data.
σa was selected so that the model matches the volatility of output (1.49) and σµ in order to
match the volatility of inflation (0.16) in the model with backward looking price indexation.
Table 2: Shocks
ρ σ
Technology 0.9500 0.0042
Fiscal 0.9684 0.0104
Money supply 0.5000 0.0017
2.1 Information
We now specify the structure of information in the case of a signal extraction problem. We
assume that while the agents may observe individual specific variables (such as their own con-
sumption, technology shock, capital stock and so on) they can only imperfectly estimate the
true aggregate state of the economy. Moreover, we assume that the agents learn gradually about
the true state using the Kalman filter, based on a set of signals on aggregate variables. Without
loss of generality we can assume that some of the aggregate variables may be perfectly observed,
some other may not be observed at all and yet some other may be observed with error. For
mis–measured variable x we assume that
x?t = x
T
t + ηt
where xTt denotes the true value of the variable and ηt is a noisy process that satisfies E(ηt) = 0
for all t; E(ηtεa,t) = E(ηtεg,t) = E(ηtεµ,t) = 0; and
E(ηtηk) =
{
σ2η if t = k
0 Otherwise
Knowledge of the aggregate state of the economy matters for the agents because individual price
setting depends on expectations of future nominal marginal cost and marginal revenue, which
in turn depend on future aggregate prices, wages and so on.
An important principle is that the informational constraints are sensible in terms of location,
timing and amount of noise. Recall that the objective of our paper is to examine the effects
of a monetary policy shock. We cannot allow the true value of this shock to be perfectly
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observable as this does away with the signal extraction problem. But we cannot assume either
(without straining credibility) that the agents do not observe monetary aggregates at all (or
that they do so with substantial time lags), a common feature of the early vintage of the flexible
price, rational expectations models. Following King, 1981, we argue that while information on
monetary aggregates is readily available, observations of the current or recent monetary data (the
preliminary figures) are ridden with measurement error. This error is only gradually corrected
through subsequent data revisions. In order to establish that this type of noise in preliminary
data plays an important role in the monetary transmission mechanism we need to establish
two things. First, that the measurement error —the difference between preliminary and revised
data— is quantitatively significant. And second, that this error (which represents unperceived
money) matters for economic activity. Barro and Hercowitz, 1981, and Boschen and Grossman,
1982, have examined the latter hypothesis, based on tests that build on related theoretical
work by King, 1981. Neither pair of authors, however, finds support for the proposition that
unperceived money plays a role in the business cycle. We revisit this issue below and establish
that monetary misperceptions do matter significantly.
Let us first describe the properties of unperceived money. We have used the quarterly real time
data constructed at the Philadelphia FED to compute the measurement error for data for a
particular period as reported during that as well as subsequent periods (different vintages). In
particular, let Mt|k be the monetary aggregate (we use M1) of period t that gets reported in
period k and gt|t = logMt|t − logMt−1|t its growth rate. This is the initial data release. Let
Mt|t+i (resp. gt|t+i = logMt|t+i − logMt−1|t+i) be the revised figure for period t that is available
in period t + i, i > 0. We use t + i = T to represent the “final” release. Unperceived money
growth in t is thus defined as µt = gt|T − gt|t. Table 3 reports the properties (standard deviation
and autocorrelation) of unperceived money growth. And also of unanticipated money shocks,
εt, measured as the residuals from an autoregressive process for money growth. Unanticipated
shocks are computed based on final data. In order to gain some idea about the quantitative
significance of successive revisions of the preliminary data we also report the properties of µt|t+i =
gt|t+i − gt|t for i = 1, 2, 4, 8.
As can be seen, the measurement errors are substantial, with a standard deviation that is about
half the size of that of unanticipated money. The process of revision is gradual but there is
little autocorrelation (and hence predictability) in unperceived money. We view these finding
as establishing that misperceived money is quantitatively important.
We now turn to the question of whether these measurements errors matter for macroeconomic
activity. We have used two alternative methodologies for assessing this issue. One follows
Boschen and Grossman, 1982. We regress the growth rate of output in period t on its lagged
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Table 3: Properties of the shocks
Std. Dev. (%) ρ(1) ρ(4) Min.(%) Max.(%)
µt 0.41 0.04 0.59 -1.19 1.18
εt 0.86 -0.14 -0.17 -2.24 3.44
µt,t+1 0.12 -0.06 0.03 -0.68 0.42
µt,t+2 0.17 0.08 -0.01 -0.74 0.42
µt,t+4 0.28 0.20 0.07 -1.79 0.62
µt,t+8 0.34 0.09 0.38 -1.82 0.74
values as well as on unperceived money growth during that and previous periods.
We have estimated equations for HP–filtered output and the inflation rate according to the
specification
xt =
p∑
i=1
ρixt−i +
n∑
`=0
[
αiµt−`|T + βiεt−`
]
+ ut (9)
The unanticipated money shocks εt−` have been included in the regressions along side the un-
perceived one, µt−`, to allow us to judge the relative importance of the two sources of monetary
non-neutralities: One arising from nominal rigidities (unanticipated shocks). And the other
from informational frictions (unperceived shocks). We test for the significance of unperceived
and unanticipated shocks using an F–test. The data start in 1966:Q1, the earliest date available
in the real data series constructed by the Philadelphia FED. They end in 2000:Q4 in order to
provide room for computing subsequent revisions. We report results for the whole sample and
also for the period 1966–1982. The results are robust to including only unperceived money,
using different lag structures, using 1979 as the cut off point and so on. The number of lags is
selected based on standard information criteria. The results are reported in Table (4).
There are two main findings. First, both sources of errors matter for economic activity. And
second, unanticipated shocks have had a relatively more significant influence on output in the
more distant past and unperceived shocks in the more recent past. As can be seen, measurement
errors did not have a statistically significant effect on real economic activity in the early period,
a finding consistent with those of Barro and Hercowitz, 1981, and Boschen and Grossman, 1982.
The second method for evaluating the role of measurement error in monetary aggregates relies
on VARs of the type that are commonly used in the literature to assess the effects of monetary
policy. We have run two VARs. One considers unanticipated (based on final data) money
shocks and uses a specification similar to that of CEE, 2005. In particular, we estimate a VAR
for money growth, output growth, CPI inflation and the federal fund rate. Standard likelihood
ratio tests and information criteria favor the use of a VAR(2) representation. Money appears
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Table 4: The effects of unperceived and unanticipated money, F- Tests
Output Inflation Rate
(n, `) µt εt (n, `) µt|T εt
1966Q1–2000Q4 (3,2) 2.5726 1.9889 (4,3) 3.1897 3.1158
[0.0574] [0.1194] [0.0159] [0.0179]
1966Q1–1982Q3 (1,2) 1.1135 9.3852 (1,1) 2.9586 9.2952
[0.3534] [0.0001] [0.0614] [0.0004]
1982Q4–2000Q4 (3,0) 4.6480 3.2793 (3,0) 0.0086 2.8933
[0.0356] [0.0757] [0.9263] [0.0947]
1966Q1–2000Q4 (3,2) 3.0247 – (4,4) 4.0750 –
[0.0323] [0.0019]
1966Q1–1982Q3 (1,2) 2.2521 – (4,0) 3.2130 –
[0.0940] [0.0794]
1982Q4–2000Q4 (3,0) 3.6878 – (4,0) 0.0118 –
[0.0600] [0.9141]
1966Q1–2000Q4 (3,2) – 2.4206 (4,1) – 3.3150
[0.0694] [0.0397]
1966Q1–1982Q3 (1,2) – 11.5994 (1,1) – 7.3237
[0.0000] [0.0016]
1982Q4–2000Q4 (3,0) – 2.3183 (3,0) – 2.9500
[0.1336] [0.0915]
Note: p–values in brackets (they correspond to the F-test of the significance of each type of shock). (n, `) refers
to the number of lags of the endogenous variable, n, and of the monetary shocks, `. µt is unperceived and εt is
the unanticipated money shock.
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first in the identification scheme but the results are robust to alternative orderings in the VAR.
The other VAR considers unperceived money and uses the µ series described above. In this
case, as unperceived money growth ought to be unexplained by any of the other variables in the
VAR, we estimate a VARX for output growth, CPI inflation and the federal fund rate where µt
is introduced as an exogenous variable. Standard likelihood ratio tests and information criteria
recommend the use of three lags in the VAR part and the current value and three lags of the
unperceived money growth series.
As can be seen, from Figure 1 the reaction of output and inflation to a shock, whether unantici-
pated or misperceived is quite similar. Both output and inflation follow a hump shaped pattern.
The effects of misperceived shocks are quantitatively larger.
Figure 1: Response to shocks
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Based on this evidence, and without loss of generality we assume that the agents receive noisy
signals on the key aggregate nominal5 variables, {Rt, pi, µ}, and in particular on the vector
{Rt, pit, pit−1, pit−2, µt, µt−1, µt−2}.
We calibrated the variance of the noise on {R, pit, pit−1, pit−2, µt, µt−1, µt−2} by matching the first
5As is well known from the days of the rational expectations models of the 70s, the Achilles heel of mone-
tary business cycle models concerned their assumptions about the degree of observability of aggregate nominal
variables.
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eight periods in the IRF of inflation to a money shock in the model with backward looking price
indexation. The model is thus, by construction, able to generate inertial behavior in inflation
comparable to that generated in that model. Consequently, its plausibility can be assessed by
checking whether the amount of required noise is realistic and its location plausible and also
whether the implications of the model for the other variables is satisfactory. The calibrated
values for the volatility of noise appear in Table 5.
Table 5: volatility of noise
Rt pit pit−1 pit−2 µt µt−1 µt−2
2.23045e-4 3.1301e-3 1.5707e-3 7.8817e-4 8.2173e-3 4.1161e-3 2.0618e-3
As can be seen, the model requires quite small noise6. The measurement error is smaller than
that typically used in models of learning in the literature (see, for instance, Woodford, 2002).
And it is also smaller than that implied by our analysis of money revisions above. For inflation it
is smaller than that in the real world. For instance, the BEA reports “preliminary” and revised
values for the GDP deflator. The standard deviation of the difference between announced and
revised values for the GDP deflator from 1999–2003 was 0.48%.
3 The results
The model is log–linearized around its deterministic steady state and then solved. The solution
method for the case in which the agents solve a signal extraction problem is to be found in a
technical appendix available from the authors’ web pages.
Figure 2 presents the response of inflation, output, the nominal and the real interest rate to a
1% shock to the growth rate of the money supply under three model specifications: (i) The NK
model with fully rational, forward looking agents, that is, without any backward price indexation
(forward looking); (ii) the version with indexation (backward looking); and (iii) the version with
full rationality and signal extraction. In all three cases, the model includes three real rigidities,
namely, habit persistence, variable capital utilization and investment adjustment costs.7.
As can be seen, the three versions perform comparably with one important exception. Namely,
the response of inflation. The version with forward looking agents cannot generate inflation
6This represents the key difference from Dellas, 2006. Dellas demonstrates that the NK model with a signal
extraction problem may generate persistence in inflation and output. But in that paper, the amount of noise
assumed on aggregate nominal variables is as large as that in real variables and quite large quantitatively. In the
present paper the size of the measurement error is much more plausible.
7Using capital in place of investment adjustment costs makes no difference for the behavior of the model with
signal extraction.
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Table 6: HP moments
Var. Std Rel. Std ρ(·, y) ρ(1) ρ(2)
Data
y 1.49 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.70
c 0.80 0.54 0.86 0.87 0.69
i 6.03 4.04 0.92 0.83 0.61
h 1.88 1.26 0.83 0.92 0.73
pi 0.16 0.11 0.32 0.33 0.24
Rnom 0.40 0.27 0.21 0.81 0.57
Rreal 0.33 0.22 0.10 0.73 0.50
(b) Forward looking (no indexation)
y 1.35 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.64
c 0.21 0.16 0.86 0.88 0.65
i 4.12 3.06 0.94 0.90 0.70
h 0.83 0.61 0.88 0.76 0.47
pi 0.16 0.12 0.61 0.56 0.22
Rnom 0.01 0.01 -0.53 0.80 0.45
Rreal 0.12 0.09 -0.63 0.56 0.21
(a) Backward looking (indexation)
y 1.49 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.55
c 0.23 0.16 0.90 0.86 0.60
i 4.49 3.01 0.95 0.88 0.63
h 0.87 0.58 0.90 0.74 0.38
pi 0.16 0.11 0.54 0.81 0.43
Rnom 0.04 0.03 -0.75 0.74 0.29
Rreal 0.18 0.12 -0.71 0.70 0.28
(b) Signal extraction
y 1.51 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.56
c 0.21 0.14 0.91 0.87 0.62
i 4.19 2.77 0.94 0.89 0.68
h 1.08 0.71 0.91 0.74 0.42
pi 0.16 0.11 0.74 0.62 0.27
Rnom 0.02 0.02 -0.23 0.67 0.30
Rreal 0.15 0.10 -0.57 0.66 0.28
Note: All series are HP–filtered. Data cover the period 1960:1–2002:4, except for
aggregate weekly hours that run from 1964:1 to 2002:4. Output is defined as C+I+G.
C is nondurables and services, I includes investment and durables. pi is the CPI based
inflation rate, Rnom is the federal fund rate, and Rreal = Rnom− pi. Std. is standard
deviation, Rel. Std is standard deviation of the variable relative to that of output,
ρ(·, y) is its correlation with output and ρ(1) and ρ(2) the first and second order
autocorrelation.
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Figure 2: IRF to a money supply shock
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Note: Three model specifications: a) B.L.: Backward looking, b) F.L.: Forward
looking, c) S.E.: Signal extraction.
inertia. This finding confirms the well known fact (see Collard and Dellas, 2005) that price stag-
gering does not suffice to produce plausible dynamics. It also demonstrates that real rigidities
alone cannot help the NK model deliver the hump either. For instance, there is a widely held
view that habit persistence is sufficient to generate inertial behavior. As Figure 2 shows (see
also Collard and Dellas, 2005) this is not the case. It must be emphasized that real rigidities
are important in order to generate sufficient inertia under either backward indexation or signal
extraction. This is illustrated in in the technical Appendix (available at the authors’ web pages)
which shuts all real rigidities down.
Naturally, there is a trade off between the degree of measurement error and the strength of real
rigidities required to produce inertial behavior. As Dellas, 2006, shows, very persistent, hump
shaped responses of the key macroeconomic variables can obtain without the need for any real
rigidities when the amount of noise on nominal aggregates is high. But real rigidities and signal
extraction also play distinct roles. Real rigidities alone (in the absence of signal extraction or
backward indexation) cannot produce a hump in the dynamics of inflation, irrespective of their
size, while signal extraction can.
Table 6 reports unconditional moments both in the data and under the three model specifica-
tions. The performance of the models is comparable. Their main weaknesses are to be found in
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the under-prediction of volatilities (in particular of consumption and the nominal interest rate)
as well as their implication of counter–cyclicality in the interest rates. Note, that the model with
signal extraction does somewhat better along the last dimension. Canzoneri et al. (2004) argue
that there exists no model that can adequately capture interest rate behavior, so this weakness
is not specific to these NK models.
How robust are our findings with regard to the specification of the monetary policy rule? We
have repeated the analysis with a standard interest rate (Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor) rule
modified to include a variable inflation target (so that there is a monetary policy shock present
in the model).
log(Rt) = ρr log(Rt−1) + (1− ρr)
[
log(R) + κpi(log(pit)− log(pi?t )) + κy(log(yt)− log(y?))
]
where the output target, y?, is the steady state level of output. pi?t is the inflation target and is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process with persistence parameter 0.9999. The standard deviation
of the innovation is set such that, borrowing all other parameters from the previous version of
the model, the model matches output volatility. The parameters of the interest rate rule are
ρr=0.75, κy=0.2 and κpi=1.8. The noise is calibrated as before but now we assume that there
is no noise at all in the observations in the interest rate.
Figure 3 shows the IRFs to an inflation target (policy) shock. They are virtually indistinguish-
able from those in Figure 2.
4 Conclusions
The new Keynesian model has provided a valuable framework for the analysis of monetary policy.
Nevertheless, in spite of its overall success, the model has had difficulties accounting for the
empirical behavior of inflation. Its recent extensions, in particular the Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans, (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2004) version, fare much better empirically but this
success owes much to the adoption of questionable backward pricing schemes. These schemes
seem to be at variance with the behavior of prices as documented for instance in the ECB project
on inflation persistence.
In this paper we have argued that there may exist another, more satisfactory solution. This so-
lution embeds Lucas’ signal extraction problem into a model with sticky prices and real rigidities
but leaves out backward price indexation. This combination allows short lived mis–perceptions
of the state of the economy to constrain initial responses while propagating the shocks over
time through the real rigidities. Under a small and empirically plausible amount of imperfect
information (noise) the model can generate dynamics for the key macroeconomic variables that
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Figure 3: IRF to an inflation target shock
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Note: Three model specifications: a) B.L.: Backward looking, b) F.L.: Forward
looking, c) S.E.: Signal extraction.
are virtually indistinguishable from those arising in its most successful rivals. We establish also
that such “noise” in preliminary data is indeed important empirically for the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. Measurement error –the difference between preliminary and revised data–
is quantitatively significant. And this error (which represent unperceived money) matters for
economic activity.
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